University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 36
Number 2 Spring 2006

Article 17

2006

Recent Developments: Stoddard v. State: When
Deciding if an Implied Assertion Is Hearsay, the
Intent of the Declarant Is Irrelevant if the Statement
Is Offered to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted
Lee Wheeler

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wheeler, Lee (2006) "Recent Developments: Stoddard v. State: When Deciding if an Implied Assertion Is Hearsay, the Intent of the
Declarant Is Irrelevant if the Statement Is Offered to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol.
36 : No. 2 , Article 17.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol36/iss2/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

STODDARD v. STATE: WHEN DECIDING IF AN IMPLIED

ASSERTION IS HEARSAY, THE INTENT OF THE
DECLARANT IS IRRELEVANT IF THE STATEMENT IS
OFFERED TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER
ASSERTED

By: Lee Wheeler
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the intentions of the declarant are irrelevant when considering the
admissibility of an implied assertion. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681,
887 A.2d 564 (2005). The Court determined that a declarant's lack of
intent to communicate a particular belief does not increase the
reliability of the declarant's words, thus it remains inadmissible
hearsay.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Erik Stoddard ("Stoddard")
was convicted of second-degree murder and child abuse resulting in
death. Jennifer Pritchett ("Pritchett"), Stoddard's girlfriend at the
time, was the mother of the eighteen-month old victim. Pritchett
testified at trial that her older daughter came to her one evening after
the killing and asked, "Is Erik going to get me?" The Defendant
objected to this portion of the mother's testimony arguing it was
inadmissible hearsay.
At trial, the state argued that the child's question was not hearsay
because it was a question being offered to demonstrate that the child
feared the Defendant and it was not being offered to prove that the
child witnessed the Defendant murder the victim. The trial judge
overruled the Defendant's objections and allowed the testimony into
evidence.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's
determination that the child's statement was not hearsay, reasoning
that the question, "Is Erik going to get me?" was a non-assertive
verbal utterance. The intermediate court reasoned that the question
was not an assertion because it was unintentional and circumstantial
evidence of the declarant's state of mind, which is nonhearsay under
Md. Rule 5-801. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address
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the issue of whether a declarant's intentions are relevant when
deciding if an implied assertion is hearsay. Stoddard, 389 Md. 681,
687,887 A.2d 564,567-68.
The Court began by reviewing the doctrine of implied assertions in
Maryland. Id. at 688-90, 887 A.2d at 568-70. The Court also defined
implied assertions as "implications or inferences contained within or
drawn from an utterance." Id. The Court reviewed the often-cited case
of Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Ch. 1837), in which a
will was contested on the basis of incapacity. Stoddard, 389 at 68993, 887 A.2d at 570. In Wright, the defendant sought to introduce
letters written to the testator to prove that the authors of the letters
believed the testator to be of sound mind. Stoddard, 389 at 691, 887
A.2d at 570 (citing Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. 488). These letters were
nonetheless excluded as hearsay because they were offered to show
that the testator was competent and thus, offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. Id. In Wright, Baron Parke, writing for the court,
relied on the illustration of a sea captain who was seen inspecting a
ship and then later embarked on a voyage with his family. Stoddard,
389 at 691-92, 887 A.2d at 570 (citing Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. 488).
According to Baron Parke, if the Captain's actions were thought to
demonstrate the seaworthiness of the ship, it would be hearsay. Id.
The English court noted in Wright that the intent of the declarant was
irrelevant as "declarant's intent beliefs communicated accidentally by
implication are as much 'implied assertions' as beliefs expressed
purposefully in an indirect manner." Stoddard, 389 Md. at 692-93,887
A.2d at 571 (citing Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. 488).
The Court then examined Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) and its
accompanying Advisory Committee note that distinguishes between
hearsay and non-hearsay by looking at the intent of the declarant. Id.
at 693, 887 A.2d at 571. Several jurisdictions have adopted the
language of the Advisory note while others have held that intent of the
declarant is irrelevant when considering whether a statement is
hearsay. Id. at 693-94, 887 A.2d at 571-72.
The Court continued its analysis by reviewing the corresponding
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-801. Id. at 695, 887 A.2d at 572-73.
The Committee note of Maryland Rule 5-801 departs substantially
from the Advisory note of the Federal Rule. Id. The Committee note
does not define assertion and states that the definition is best left to the
development of case law. Id. at 696, 887 A.2d at 572.
The Court continued by listing the dangers associated with hearsay
in general and specifically with implied assertions. !d. at 696, 887
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A.2d at 573. The four hearsay dangers are: sincerity, narration,
perception, and memory. ld. These dangers arise because the
statement is made out of court and not under oath or subject to crossexamination. In tum, the jury does not have the ability to evaluate or
observe demeanor, circumstances, or other relevant facts that would
assist it in its evaluation of the declarant's statement. ld.
As for implied assertions, although the Court stated the danger with
this type of statement is the risk of insincerity, it noted the other
hearsay dangers are implicated as well. ld. at 698, 887 A.2d at 574
(emphasis added). The State used the Advisory Committee note to the
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) to support its argument that the
danger of insincerity is diminished because if a declarant does not
intend to make an· assertion, then he cannot intend to make a
misrepresentation. ld. The Court, however, disagreed citing several
scholars who have examined implied assertions and reliability. ld. at
698-701,887 A.2d at 574-75. The Court noted the theory of Professor
Ronald Bacigal who argued that implied assertions are not reliable
because there is no effort to "avoid ambiguity;" therefore, the
interpretation of the meaning is inherently umeliable. ld. (citing
Ronald J. Bacigal, Implied Hearsay: Defusing the Battle Line Between
Pragmatism and Theory, 11 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1127, 1132 (1987)). The
Court also cited Professor Michael Graham's theory that the danger of
insincerity exists with implied assertions because truth of the
implication itself must be assumed. Stoddard, 389 at 702, 887 A.2d at
576 (citing Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence
Section 801.7, at 73-77 (5 th ed. 2001)).
Ultimately, the Court held that the declarant's lack of intent to
communicate a particular idea through an implied assertion was
irrelevant to the inquiry of whether or not the assertion was hearsay.
ld. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577. In making this decision, the Court
admittedly joined a minority of other jurisdictions in disallowing an
inquiry into the intentions of a declarant who made an implied
assertion. ld.
The Court of Appeals adopted the Third and Sixth Circuit's
holdings, regarding implied assertions, that an inquiry into the
intentions of the declarant is unnecessary. fd. at 704-7,887 at 577-79.
In U.S. v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit
held that a co-defendant's statement, "I didn't tell them anything about
you," was hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant was a coconspirator in the crime. Stoddard, 389 at 704-5, 887 A.2d at 578. In
U.s. v. Palma-Ruedas the statement, "nice to meet you," was hearsay
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when offered to show that the declarant had not previously met the
listener. 121 F.3d 841, 857 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 526
U.S. 275 (1999) (cited in Stoddard, 389 Md. at 706,887 A.2d at 57879).
The Court of Appeals also cited the Sixth Circuit opinion of Lyle v.
Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 432-33 (6 th Cir. 1983) which held that a letter
requesting a defendant to give a false alibi for a co-defendant was an
implied assertion and hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant
was guilty. Stoddard, 389 Md. at 706, 887 A.2d at 578-79. The Court
of Appeals also referenced the Iowa Supreme Court, which stated,
"Implied assertions can be no more reliable than the predicate
expressed assertion." Stoddard, 389 Md. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577
(quoting State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Iowa, 2003).
In the remainder of its decision, the Court determined that the form
of an assertion, in this case, a question, is not determinative of whether
or not a statement is hearsay because the declarant "potentially
communicated a factual proposition." Id. at 710, 887 A.2d at 581-82.
The Court reasoned that a question could be just as insincere as a
statement similar in kind. Id.
In the majority's holding, the Court rejected the idea that a lack of
intention on the part of a declarant who makes an implied assertion
reduces the hearsay dangers. In so doing, the Court of Appeals joined
a minority of jurisdictions and narrowed the admissibility of implied
assertions. While the Court's holding protects against the dangers of
hearsay, it further limits the evidence that a jury is allowed to evaluate
and expands the role of a judge.

